For one entire year in New Zealand a judicial inquiry has been under way into the treatment of carcinoma in situ of the cervix at the National Women's Hospital in Auckland. The National Women's is the teaching hospital for the Auckland University School of Medicine's department of obstetrics and gynaecology and the Postgraduate School of Obstetrics and Gynaecology. The inquiry was set up after a magazine article, entitled "An 'unfortunate experiment' at National Women's,"' alleged that an experimental research programme had been undertaken at the hospital entailing the study of the natural course of carcinoma in situ of the cervix by withholding conventional treatment from some patients. The authors of the article further alleged that an internal inquiry, set up after criticisms of the programme by two hospital doctors, had been a "white wash" and that there was no evidence that the research and the withholding of conventional treatment had ever formally ceased.
These allegations resulted in the setting up of a committee of inquiry led by one woman, Judge Silvia Cartwright. At the public hearings further claims were made. Among these were that vaginal smears had been taken from over 2000 new-born babies, as part of the same research, apparently without the knowledge or consent of their mothers; that a randomised controlled trial of treatment for invasive cervical cancer had been undertaken without the consent of patients; that groups ofstudents had carried out vaginal examinations of anaesthetised women without their consent; and that postgraduate students had inserted and removed intrauterine devices on anaesthetised women before hysterectomy.
The public hearings started in August 1987 and continued until January 1988. The judge's report was released on 5 August 1988.2 I served as one of the three medical advisers to Judge Cartwright. I believe that the ethical issues raised by the inquiry go beyond the specific difficulties in one institution to the underlying problem of accountability in medicine. Indeed, the study at the centre of the inquiry was widely known to gynaecologists beyond New Zealand; yet only one attempted to intervene.
The allegations
The investigations leading to the magazine publication were made by two feminists: one a journalist (Coney) , the other an academic in the area of women's studies (Bunkle). The starting point for their investigation was the paper "The invasive potential of carcinoma in situ of the cervix," recording the apparent outcome of the study, written by Mclndoe et outset in other studies the ability of the colposcopist to rule out invasion with colposcopically directed punch biopsies was crucial. In fact, the newly trained colposcopist was not confident of having this ability; thus a second risk-that an invasive cancer might be overlooked-was added to the first, that an in situ cancer might progress to invasion.
Despite this conclusion, that the proposal represented hazards to the patients outweighing the benefits of lesser surgery, the hazards need not have been very great if the trial had been appropriately monitored and finished. The aim of the study, as stated in the minutes, was "to prove that CIS [carcinoma in situ] is not a premalignant disease" (exhibit 6, cervical cancer inquiry). Green had set up a study in which he had the opportunity to disprove his hypothesis. Should one case occur in which invasive cancer developed the hypothesis would be disproved, the study stopped, and the remaining patients treated. Should no cases develop invasion many women would be spared major surgery. Moreover, all the trouble, morbidity, and expense of screening and treating women could be abandoned in New Zealand and elsewhere. The importance of the objectives of the research might almost have been said to be in proportion to the risks. 4 Should consent have been soughtfrom the patients to be part ofsuch a study?
It was suggested early in the inquiry by a medical ethicist, Alastair Campbell, who was called as an expert witness, that the balance of risks and benefits was the overriding consideration, more important than consent. Thus if the risks were regarded as unacceptable it would be inappropriate to seek the consent of patients; the research should not proceed (transcript ofevidence, cervical cancer inquiry). Nevertheless, Beecher in his discussion of consent to clinical experimentation had stated that "the final decision as to the degree of acceptable risk belongs to the subject" and further "some studies bearing moderate risk may be entirely ethical when fully informed consent is obtained, but are otherwise unethical." '2 Clearly the subject can make this decision only if information on the risks of participation is presented accurately and fairly. If clinical research carrying moderate risk is to proceed it should do so only with the informed consent of the subject. The practice of seeking such consent to clinical experimentation was endorsed by the 1964 Helsinki declaration, which recommended that "if at all possible consistent with patient psychology, the doctor should obtain the patient's freely given consent after the patient has been given a full explanation."4 Consent to non-therapeutic research had already been regarded as essential, but the Helsinki declaration provided for exceptions where on occasion consent might not be sought for therapeutic research.
Some of those who have argued against universal informed consent for therapeutic experimental research have done so on the grounds that similar disclosure should obtain for a trial as for ordinary treatment. For example, Doll has written that "so long as physicians limit trials to situations in which they genuinely do not know what is the best way to treat patients, weighing potential risks against benefits, it is, I believe, frequently undesirable to be explicit about the nature of the trial, just as the doctor who is not carrying out a trial is normally not explicit about all the uncertainties associated with the treatment he prescribes."13 Others have argued that full understanding before consent may be so difficult to secure that in certain cases there is no such thing as genuinely informed consent. '4 But the situation described above by Doll does not apply to the circumstances at the National Women's Hospital. The National Women's Hospital trial concerned women who had been screened by cervical cytology and referred by their general practitioners because of abnormal findings for the express purpose of treatment at the preinvasive stage. The trial did not entail two alternative treatments, but the withholding of treatment from some women. The implicit ethical undertaking when women had been offered screening was that there should be some benefit to them in detecting an abnormality.'5 In addition, there were acknowledged risks of non-treatment potentially greater than those of treatment, so that the decision to allow a deviation from accepted treatment carried a responsibility to inform the patients that they were not being offered the generally accepted treatment, of the risks which this entailed, and of the alternatives available. I Interestingly, the doctors who felt able to evaluate and judge Green's work and even write it up for publication came from the non-academic staff. But the response of some other staff, including academics, to the paper was to misunderstand its conclusions. For instance, several staff who gave evidence at the public hearings, concluded from the paper by Mclndoe et al3 that the rate of progression of carcinoma in situ to invasion, must lie between the rate for the untreated or partially treated group and the rate for the successfully treated group (transcript of evidence, cervical cancer inquiry). Furthermore, after publication of that paper no meetings had been organised to discuss the results and their implications for hospital practice. In a climate in which scientific issues are not openly discussed and yet scientists are given a special place, there is danger that the aberrant views ofone individual may go unchallenged.
ACCOUNTABILITY
The Declaration of Geneva requires doctors to affirm that "I will practise my profession with conscience and dignity"; "the health of my patient will be my first consideration"; and "my colleagues will be my brothers."24 To whom should doctors be accountable first: their own conscience, their patients, or their colleagues? A view implicit in much of the evidence at the public hearings was that a clear conscience would dictate that any doctor would act in the patient's best interests. The retired superintendent in chief of the Auckland Hospital Board emphasised: "This above all-to thine own self be true. And it must follow, as the night the day, thou canst not then be false to any man" (transcript of evidence, cervical cancer inquiry). There was even a reference in the minutes of the meeting at which the 1966 proposal had been approved to Professor Green, "whose conscience is clear and who could therefore accept complete responsibility for whatever happens. . . ." (hospital medical committee minutes, exhibit 11, cervical cancer inquiry). But, as anyone familiar with Hamlet knows, Polonius's advice to Laertes is too facile a view of human nature. You may behave irrationally and yet have a clear conscience.
Of even more concern at the inquiry was that the dictum "my colleagues will be my brothers" had been taken too much to heart. The failure of the hospital and the university authorities to act appropriately after concerns had been raised in 1973 may best be understood as a failure to put the safety of patients before the reputation of colleagues. During the public hearings the notion of clinical freedom was used to defend the actions of colleagues; only illegal actions seemed beyond its scope (transcript of evidence, cervical cancer inquiry). Possibly the situation at the National Women's Hospital is no exception to the way that doctors usually behave. Friedson has argued that the service orientation of the medical profession has been promoted by doctors pursuing their claims for autonomy but that there was little empirical evidence to support this orientation.25 Furthermore, he argued that if the profession fails to regulate itself according to that orientation, which ostensibly puts the patients first, and if the public sees that failure the profession risks losing its freedom from lay supervision and control. "The profession's privileged position is given by, not seized from, society, and it may be allowed to lapse or may even be taken away." Since Friedson published this opinion there has been a lot more talk about peer review and medical audit as ways of internally regulating the profession, but little evident action.
WOMEN
Complaints about the treatment of patients in hospital usually come from the patients themselves. In this case, however, it seems there were no such complaints. Undoubtedly this is partly accountece tor by the symptomless nature of the initial condition, which had in most cases been detected by routine screening. The women could not gauge the effectiveness of treatment by monitoring their own symptoms in the usual way. Some women had complained to their general practitioners that they were going back repeatedly to the hospital and nothing seemed to be being done (transcript of evidence, cervical cancer inquiry). The general practitioners had been helpful and had referred the woman privately or even got in touch with Dr Mclndoe, who had tried to help, but no woman or general practitioner had apparently made a formal complaint to the hospital.
Could men have been in exactly the same position? It seems to me likely that women were more vulnerable at that time to being included in a trial of treatment without their knowledge and consent and more likely to endure such a trial without making formal complaint. Women have been familiar with being patients in many aspects of reproductive function.
The 1960s probably saw the height of the medicalisation of childbirth. The extraordinary patience of women such as "Ruth," who returned to the hospital for an endless series of examinations and biopsies, was possibly conditioned by earlier years of antenatal clinic attendance. I suggest that women were vulnerable because they were used to submitting to medical checks without being told the exact purpose. I consider that they were also vulnerable because they were exposed to examination of the genital area by male doctors; in this situation the asymmetry of power between the doctor and the patient is exaggerated. The public's scepticism and distrust of the scientist and the researcher in medicine may be due to an overemphasis on understanding mechanisms and on developing new technology and to a neglect for evaluating the outcome of treatments. The emphasis needs to be shifted. Paradoxically, New Zealand medical scientists are concerned that publicity about the study at the National Women's Hospital may make research more difficult to undertake because of public distrust or bureaucratic overregulation. I believe distrust will be an unavoidable consequence of the inquiry, but it would be folly to blame the publicity itself and not the real problems it disclosed.
Will the interests of patients be safeguarded in future by the profession reasserting its commitment to medical audit? The debate seems to have reached an impasse. The reason given by the profession for medical audit is almost always as a means to satisfy the public in order to ward off "regulation from outside the profession that will severely curtail our clinical freedom."27 If there are real reasons why the public wants to curtail clinical freedom-and this inquiry suggests that there are-the profession should be as concerned as the public. Would a truly service orientation result in such reluctance to form an alliance with the public to improve the safeguards for patients? The profession is already losing some of its autonomy from lay supervision and control in New Zealand, as was shown by the establishment of a committee of one lay person to inquire into the National Women's Hospital allegations.
There are dangers in control by the laity: an overemphasis on the easily quantifiable, especially cost; unfamiliarity with the technical and scientific aspects of medicine; and ignorance of the uncertainties on which clinical judgment is often based. Surely some of these difficulties could be overcome by bringing the public and the profession closer together? The public needs to understand that mistakes are common in medicine, and are often inevitable. McIntyre and Popper have called for a new ethics to allow the profession to acknowledge and deal with error.28 They recommend a new critical attitude in medicine-to one's own work and to that of others. But this requires tolerance; "in the search for mistakes there should be no denigration of others." Condemnation would then be properly reserved for those who sought to cover up error.
Inevitably, new consent procedures will be recommended, especially for patients concerned in research and teaching. In the past the principal safeguard for the patient has been the integrity and good faith of the doctor. When that good faith is brought into question at the highest levels in the hospital there must be recourse to other mechanisms to protect the patient. Patients will welcome more information and a greater chance to make informed decisions about their treatments, but I suspect that both doctors and patients will continue to worry about the lack of trust. People who are ill need to be able to trust their medical advisers, but that trust is not bestowed with a higher degree; if it has been abused it will need to be earned again.
It is tempting to imagine that the increasing proportion of women in medicine will change professional attitudes. Women gynaecologists have the advantage that they are familiar with some of the experiences of their women patients. But Patients with a diagnosis of fracture-dislocation of the cervical spine must have their fracture immobilised immediately. Traction can be applied with skull tongs and various types are used. We report two cases of brain abscess complicating the use of Cones callipers.
Case reports
Case I-A 66 year old man sustained a fracturedislocation of C4-5, which was treated orthopaedically by traction for seven weeks with the use of Cones callipers. Five months later a right temporal osteomyelitis developed and sequestrectomy was performed under local anaesthesia. Seven months after that procedure the patient was admitted to the regional neurosurgery unit with headache, drowsiness, left hemiparesis, and a fever of 38-5°C. Computed tomography (CT) showed multiple abscesses in the right temporal lobe; the neck was stable. The abscesses were excised at craniotomy. Culture disclosed a heavy growth of Staphylococcus aureus, and benzylpenicillin and chloramphenicol were started. The hemiparesis resolved by the second postoperative day.
Case 2-A 52 year old man suffered a fracturedislocation of C6-7. This was treated by skull traction with use of Cones callipers. Three weeks later he began to have focal seizures affecting the face and arm and increasing drowsiness. Radiographs and CT of the cervical spine showed the fracture to be stable, and CT in the regional neurosurgery unit disclosed an abscess in the right temporal lobe. This was drained through a small craniectomy, and culture grew Staph aureus. Chloramphenicol and benzylpenicillin were given, and by the 10th postoperative day the patient was alert and had minimal drift of the left arm.
Mechanisms of skull tongs in common use and list of those that should be abandoned Risk of infection of central nervous system is present when dura is exposed, greatest when dura is penetrated.
Discussion
Brain abscess has been reported in 13 patients treated with skull tongs'-4 and two treated with halo fixators.
I The diagnosis may not be obvious and a high level of suspicion is required; five of the 13 patients quoted above died. The abscess may be preceded by local osteomyelitis of the skull, for which limited sequestrectomy or antibiotics, or both, are rarely adequate.
All the reported cases of brain abscess occurred after the use of tongs that lacked a mechanism for limiting the depth of penetration into the skull. In 12 of the 13 cases there was a definite breach in the inner table. In six, however, the dura was found to be intact at exploration, suggesting that penetration of bone was the relevant factor. There have been no cases of abscess reported after the use of Gardner-Wells tongs, which have a spring loaded mechanism that prevents penetration of the inner table ofthe skull (table) . Cones callipers lack this mechanism. They and similar types of skull tongs should no longer be used.
